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Parties 
Parties to this action are as follows: 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES. INC.. a Utah corporation d/b/a 
HOPE OF AMERICA THRIFT STORE; SINE INVESTMENT. INC.. d/b/a/ 
SCOTT'S TRAVEL MOTOR HOTELS; SITE. INC.. d/b/a TEN PIN 
LOUNGE; RANCHO LANES. INC.. d/b/a RANCHO 42 LANES RECREATION 
CENTER; JERRY SINE INVESTMENTS, a partnership d/b/a SE RANCHO 
MOTOR MOTEL; and STOCKHOLM RESTAURANT. INC.; 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Municipal Corporation of the 
State of Utah; SALT LAKE CITY MAYOR. TED WILSON; AL HAYNES. 
Assistant to Salt Lake City Mayor; CITY ENGINEER. MAX 
PETERSON; RICK JOHNSTON. Assistant City Engineer; STATE OF 
UTAH; SCOTT MATHESON. as Governor of the State of Utah; STATE 
COUNCIL OF DEFENSE; STATE ROAD COMMISSION; and SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah; 
Defendants and Respondents. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Does Soverign Immunity Bar Plaintiffs' action 
against Salt Lake County? 
II. Can Plaintiffs1 alleged Injury Be Considered as 
a "Taking" of Property Which Requires Compensation? 
DISPOSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act: 
Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Code, 1953 as amended, 
states in pertinent part: 
(Section 63-30-3). . . 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. 
(Section 63-30-9) Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for any 
injury caused from a dangerous or defective 
condition of any public building, structure, 
dam, reservoir, or other public 
improvement. Immunity is not waived for 
latent defective conditions. 
(Section 63-30-10)(1)) Immunity from suit 
of all governmental entities is waved for 
injury proximately caused by a negligient 
act or ommission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the 
injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
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perform a discretionary function, whether or 
not the discretion is abused, or . . . 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any 
property. . . . 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I, Section 22. Private Property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is Plaintiffs1 attempt to recover alleged 
damages, allegedly caused them by the Defendants' actions 
relating to the control of flood waters of City Creek arising 
in May and June, 1983. Events preceding this appeal are as 
follows: 
1. By complaint filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court on September 15, 1983, Plaintiffs demanded 
damages from the Defendants, and alleged, as to Salt Lake 
County that the County was negligent in the circumstances and 
also alleged a taking of their property rights. 
2. Salt Lake County answered and filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment after discovery had been duly completed. 
Defendants of the State of Utah did the same. Defendants of 
Salt Lake City filed a Motion to Dismiss. 
3. The Motion for Summary Judgment and the Motion 
to Dismiss were considered together under Rules 54 and 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. On November 27, 1984, Trial Judge 
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Philip R. Fishier entered his Memorandum Decision granting 
Judgment to all Defendants upon their respective motions. 
After considering Plaintiffs1 demand for specific findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, and considering other objections 
by Plaintiffs to the proposed order of judgment, the Court 
entered its signed order for Summary Judgment on February 11, 
1985. 
4. The Court based its Memorandum Decision and 
Order granting Summary Judgment upon two general principles: 
(a) governmental immunity under Title 63, Chapter 
30, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended; and 
(b) lack of "taking" of Plaintiffs property rights. 
5. Plaintiffs now appeal from the Trial Court's 
Order for Summary Judgment. By their Docketing Statement and 
"Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal" contained in their 
brief. Plaintiffs seem to argue that: 
(1) There exists an issue of fact as to negligence 
which precludes summary judgment; 
(2) there was a "taking" of their property by 
actions of the defendants which requires compensation; and 
(3) the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has waived 
sovereign immunity for the operation of a government "culvert." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. City Creek is a natural channel within Salt Lake 
County, arising in City Creek Canyon north of Salt Lake City 
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and running south-southwesterly in an open channel through City 
Creek Canyon down to Memory Grove where it enters a conduit, i 
The conduit carries the waters of City Creek from Memory Grove 
in a south-southwesterly direction underground and parallel to 
Canyon Road to the intersection of North Temple and State o 
Streets. From there the conduit runs directly west underneath 
North Temple to its outfall at the Jordan River at 
approximately 12th West. (Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence; < 
R.137; R.144; R.169). 
2. The conduit referenced above is an 84-inch 
diameter pipe constructed of cast-in-place concrete. (R.137). 
3. Said conduit was initially constructed in stages 
between 1892 and 1925 under the authority and direction of Salt 
Lake City. (R.156). i 
4. No design or construction flaws existed in the 
conduit as constructed which would cause or contribute to a 
blockage of the conduit by sediment or debris. (R. 141; R.166). ' 
5. The conduit follows the path of the historic, 
open channel of City Creek. (R.65). 
6. North Temple Street, between Second West and the ( 
Jordan River was. in 1983. a highway of the State of Utah. 
under the overall jurisdiction of the Utah Department of 
Transportation. (Sections 27-12-7 through 27-12-11; Utah Code 
Annotated. 1953 as amended. Section 27-12-49.1 Utah Code 
Annotated. 1953 as amended). 
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7. Salt Lake County is a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah with the authority to provide for the 
carrying away and safe disposal of natural storm and flood 
waters by utilization and regulation of the natural channels 
within the county. (Constitution of Utah, Art. XI Section 1; 
Section 17-8-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended). 
8. Salt Lake City is a Utah municipal corporation 
with the requisite police power to provide for the health, 
safety and welfare of its citizens, and for the building and 
repairing of sewers, tunnels, conduits, and drains. (Sections 
10-8-84; 10-8-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended). 
9. Beginning in the fall of 1981, northern Utah 
experienced the beginning on an unusual wet cycle. In 
September, 1982, heavy rains occured within Salt Lake County 
and the wet cycle continued into the winter of 1982 - 1983. 
The effect of this early precipitation was to saturate the 
soils and preclude any further ability of said soils to absorb 
additional moisture. In the winter of 1982 -1983, extremely 
heavy snowfall ranging from 150% to 300% of normal occurred on 
the watersheds of all Salt Lake County creeks and streams. 
Said snow storms continued through the very cold and wet spring 
of 1983, and other extremely heavy, wet snowfall occurred 
across the watersheds as late as May, 1983. The conditions for 
flooding were triggered by an extreme rise in temperatures in 
Salt Lake County beginning May 21. Between May 27 and May 31, 
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near record high temperatures occurred each day. As a 
consequence, the snow melt within the City Creek watershed 
concentrated in City Creek all at once. The result was a 
raging torrent of water which doubled previously recorded peak 
flows of City Creek and which raged down City Creek Canyon 
eroding entire banks and hillsides, and carrying downstream 
thousands of tons of gravel, silt, trees, etc. The erosion was 
such that the banks of the stream upwards of five miles from 
Memory Grove were washed away. The same conditions as 
described caused all other streams within the County. in 
addition to City Creek, to be in flood stage during the end of 
May and well into June of 1983. (R. 159-160. 164-165; R.581. 
p.5, pp. 41-42. pp.44-45; R.584. p.43). 
10. In preparation for the 1983 snow-melt run-off. 
crews of Salt Lake County's Flood Control Division had worked 
in the City Creek channel to clear it, and had cleaned the 
debris settlement pond located in Memory Grove. (R.581, p. 5, 
pp.43-44). 
11. As the flows in City Creek began to rise, a 
decision was made jointly between Salt Lake County and Salt 
Lake City to put the City in complete charge of the active 
effort to control and manage the City Creek water, and the 
County would direct its efforts towards other County streams. 
(R.581. pp. 33-34. R.584. p. 11). 
12. From that point, the contact between the City 
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and the County concerning the City Creek flood consisted of 
oral coordination and concurrences between Al Haines, Chief 
Administrator of Salt Lake City, who took over all charge of 
the City's effort, and Terry Holzworth, County Flood Control 
Director. (R.584, pp.30-31). 
13. Because of the amount of water, and the 
projections for even higher flows in City Creek, Salt Lake City 
made plans for carrying part of the flow down State Street to 
Fourth South, where the Fourth South storm drain would be 
utilized to carry the excess water to the Jordan River. 
(R.584, pp. 11-12). 
14. The waters in City Creek reached their peak flow 
about midnight. May 31, 1983. That flow was measured at 
approximately 350 cubic feet per second (cfs). (R.158, 66, 
140). 
15. The capacity of the City Creek conduit, 
underlying North Temple in an unpressurized state is 
approximately 130-160 cfs. (R.137, 158). In a pressurized 
state, assuming clean water flows, the capacity of said conduit 
is 250 cfs. (R.582, p.57). 
16. On Monday night. May 30, 1983, said conduit 
became blocked. (R.584, p. 12). 
17. The blockage consisted of the sediment, silt and 
debris which had been carried down by the flood waters of City 
Creek. It completely filled the conduit from about 400 West to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
about 700 West. (R.582, p.23). 
18. The sediment carried by City Creek consisted of 
thousands of tons of rocks and silt (R.581, pp.44-45). 
19. The sediment in City Creek was so heavy that 
after the water of the creek was sent down State Street, and 
routed through the Fourth South, Eighth South and Ninth South 
conduits, in order to relieve the flooding pressure upon North 
Temple Street, the Fourth South conduit became completely 
plugged and the Eighth and Ninth South conduits threatened to 
become plugged. (R.584, p.37). 
20. As a result of the blockage of the conduit 
underlying North Temple, the flood waters of City Creek were 
forced above ground in the location of the blockage. These 
waters were then channeled down North Temple via sandbag 
"banks" around the blockage and back into the conduit at about 
Tenth West. Shortly thereafter, all the flood waters of City 
Creek were sent down Canyon Road and State Street by blocking 
the conduit inlet at Memory Grove. This was done in an effort 
to dry out the area of the blockage so that attempts could be 
made to clear it. The flood waters down Canyon Road then 
washed out that area so badly that the sewage, water, and 
utility lines buried in that street were in extreme danger of 
breaking. At this point, the waters of City Creek were 
directed back to the North Temple conduit and carried down 
North Temple as needed to protect the utilities. About June 9, 
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the blockage in the North Temple conduit was removed and all 
City Creek waters were placed back into the conduit. 
(R.160-162; R.584, pp.12-13, 33, 36-37, 42). 
21. By this time the waters of City Creek had 
receded to a level of 140-150 cfs, and could be carried 
completely in the conduit. (R.584, p.42). 
22. The blockage was finally cleared by removing the 
top of the conduit and scooping the sediment out with 
backhoes. (R.162). 
23. Immediately after the flood waters subsided 
enough to permit it, private consulting engineers which had 
been obtained by Salt Lake County on June 6, 1983, to provide 
for the design of repairs to flood damaged public improvements 
throughout the entire length and breadth of Salt Lake County, 
began their study of the means necessary to repair the conduit 
under North Temple. (R.306). 
24. The flows of City Creek did not recede within 
the conduit to such a point as to allow the engineering design 
work to be done until the last week of August, 1983. (R.307). 
25. After completion of the engineer's study and 
design report. Salt Lake County awarded a contract for repairs 
of the conduit and restoration of the affected road surface on 
September 19, 1983. (R.82). 
26. Said contract was completed on November 18, 
1983. (R.141). 
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27. During the periods while water flowed upon the 
surface of North Temple, while the City was attempting to clear 
the blockage in the conduit, while the conduit lay open until 
the water flows of City Creek subsided sufficiently to permit 
the consulting engineer's study and design report and until 
repairs were completed on November 18, 1983, barricades were 
placed to direct traffic away from the affected areas of the 
street. Except for the short period of time that the flood 
waters of City Creek were completely contained within the 
sandbag "banks" along North Temple Street, traffic was 
permitted upon North Temple Street. Said traffic consisted of 
two-way traffic, headed both east and west upon the street. 
The affect of the open conduit and the barricades placed to 
warn the public, was to create a "median" around which traffic 
could flow, but which could not be crossed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs allege damages proximately caused by the 
Defendants1 negligence in failing to control the snowmelt 
run-off from the City Creek watershed into City Creek during 
May and June, 1983; and a "taking" of the ingress-egress rights 
they held with respect to North Temple Street as that street 
and its underlying City Creek conduit were affected by the 
flood resulting from the runoff, the damage caused by said 
flood, and the subsequent repair of the conduit. 
Salt Lake County defends upon the principles of 
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sovereign immunity, upon the principles of law which do not 
allow Plaintiffs to maintain an action in inverse condemnation, 
and upon the position that no "taking" occurred. 
Sovereign immunity from suit in this case is provided 
Salt Lake County by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Title 
63, Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Salt 
Lake County is a governmental entity and may not be sued under 
the circumstances of this case under the particular provisions 
of Sections 63-30-3. 63-30-9, and 63-30-10(1) (a) and (*d). 
Plaintiffs1 claim for inverse condemndation is also 
barred by sovereign immunity, as repeatedly held by this 
Court. Further, by their own allegations, it is clear that 
Plaintiff's property was never touched by any waters of City 
Creek and that their claim relates only to ingress-egress 
rights to North Temple. The event alleged to have "taken" said 
rights was a single event which blocked North Temple completely 
for a very short period and which caused the placement of a 
barricade "median" in North Temple as the conduit underlying 
the street which was damaged by the flood, was excavated and 
repaired. There was no permanent appropriation of rights, but 
only a temporary and limited effect upon access to Plaintiffs' 
property in order to protect the public. Thus there was no 
taking. 
Further, Salt Lake County, and other Defendants acted 
within their police powers to protect the public at large 
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during the flood and its aftermath. Such exercise is permitted 
by law. even to the extent of sacrificing some property (or 
access "rights") for the good of the larger body of the public. 
In any event, Utah law does not recognize a right of 
property owners to receive compensation for loss of access, 
particularly where such loss is not complete or is only 
temporary. 
Summary Judgment in this case in favor of the 
Defendants was property entered in the Court below. That 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Does Sovereign Immunity Bar Plaintiffs1 Action 
Against Salt Lake County? 
Respondent. Salt Lake County, is a legal subdivision 
of the State of Utah. (Art. XI. Section 1. Constitution of 
Utah). As such, it is a body corporate and politic; with 
powers relating to that status (Sections 17-4-1. 17-4-3. Utah 
Code Annotated. 1953 as amended. See also Utah State Building 
Commission v. Great American Indemnity Co.. 140 P.2d 763. 
766-767 (Utah. 1943)). The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
specifically applies to Salt Lake County. (Section 63-30-2(2), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended). 
Section 63-30-3 of the Act preserves sovereign 
immunity for Salt Lake County in the exercise of a governmental 
function. The Court has defined "governmental function." in 
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the cases of Standiford v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah, 
1980); Johnson v. Salt Lake City, 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981); and 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983) to be an activity 
"of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency" (Standiford, supra, at 1237); essential to 
the core of government responsibility (Johnson, supra, at 434) 
or which serves to protect the public interest in a way that 
cannot be done by a private agency (Borthick, supra, at 631). 
By all of those criteria, flood control is a 
governmental function. The control of flood waters which cross 
private property boundaries, city boundaries, county 
boundaries, and even state boundaries is "of such a unique 
nature" that it could only be performed by government. Only 
governments could mobilize and focus the resources needed for a 
flood control effort. Of course, private individuals can make 
an effort to control flood waters, but logically, their concern 
in doing so is bounded by the limits of their own interests. 
No private company would undertake a flood control effort 
because there would be no reliable prospect for a return on the 
investment needed for such an effort. Even the installation of 
a routine storm drain would not be profitable to a private 
company, for how could the use of the drain be controlled and a 
fee exacted? Who would pay for the use generated by rainfall 
or snowmelt? Without the ability to obtain a fee there would 
be no profits. Without profits, there would be no private 
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agency to plan for. install and later maintain storm drains. 
Flood control and storm drainage are strictly public interest 
propositions and will never be undertaken except by 
governments. Since the purpose of flood control is to protect 
the public safety, health and welfare, it is certainly 
essential to the core of governmental activity. 
Flood control and storm water management are thus 
qualitatively different from the operation of a sanitary sewage 
system which is discussed in Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). There can be no comparison between a 
closed system for the transportation and treatment of sewage, 
the users of which can be readily identified and billed for 
their use, and a storm drainage or flood water management 
system which must necessarily be left open at many points to 
intercept and catch the surface water generated by storms and 
snowmelt. In their brief. Plaintiffs attempt to equate flood 
control to the sanitary sewer discussed in Thomas v. Clearfield 
City, however, it is respectfully submitted that the difference 
between flood water and storm drainage systems and sanitary 
sewers is so vast that the only similarity is that storm drains 
are sometimes called storm "sewers." Nor can a system for 
flood control and storm water drainage be realistically equated 
with an irrigation company's ditch, flume, or conduit sized and 
installed to carry a pre-determined flow of water, the size of 
which is controlled at the source by headgates, weirs, or the 
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like. 
Salt Lake County further submits that by the enactment 
of Section 1, Chapter 33 of the Laws of 1984, the legislature 
of Utah has settled any question as to: 
(1) Whether the management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities are governmental functions; and, 
(2) Whether Salt Lake County is immune from suit for 
any injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
By specific language, the legislature states: 
"The management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair and operation of flood 
and storm systems by governmental entities 
are considered to be governmental functions 
and governmental entities and their officers 
and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those 
activities." 
That paragraph was added to and became part of Section 
63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. (In 1985, the 
legislature further amended the language quoted above by adding 
the phrase "the management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters.. . ) . 
The question may be raised whether the language quoted 
above from a law passed in 1984 applies to events occuring in 
1983. Salt Lake County submits that E'rank v. State, 613 P.2d 
517, (Utah, 1980) is authority for the principle that the 1984 
enactment of the legislature merely manifest the legislative 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intent that flood water management and the construction, 
operation, and repair of flood and storm water systems were, 
and always have been governmental functions, and that 
governmental entities are immune from suit for injury or damage 
resulting from such activities. 
In Frank v. State, supra, the Court considered a 1978 
enactment of the Utah legislature which amended the very same 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Therein, the Court ruled that the amendment was a manifestation 
of the legislative intent to the effect that publicly owned 
health care facilities were governmental functions, and that as 
such, the amendment applied to the Plaintiff's cause of action 
even though the events underlying Plaintiff's complaint occured 
before the statute's amendment. The same principle is 
established by Okland Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah, 1974), wherein the Court 
stated, "...this principle (that a party is entitled to have 
its right determined on the basis of the law existing at the 
time of occurrence) has no application where the later statute 
or amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as 
to how the law should have been understood prior to its 
enactment." (Id., at 208, 210-211). 
Immunity from suit for injuries or damages arising out 
of the management of flood waters and the construction, repair, 
and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
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entities was the law of Utah from at least the date of 
Wilkinson v. State. 134 Pac. 626 (Utah. 1913). The 1984 
amendment to Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act does no more than manifest the legislative intent that the 
pre-existing law of the State as stated in Wilkinson continue 
under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
For the reasons stated, the Plaintiffs' complaint 
against all Defendants is barred by the principle of sovereign 
immunity as established by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Even without consideration of the 1984 amendment to 
Section 63-30-3 as discussed above. Section 63-30-10 of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act preserves sovereign immunity to 
Salt Lake County in this case. Plaintiffs1 complaint alleges 
negligence of Defendant, Salt Lake County (and other 
Defendants) in the design, inspection and operation of the City 
Creek conduit underlying North Temple. Sovereign immunity has 
not been waived in these circumstances. 
Although Section 63-30-10 waives immunity for some 
injuries caused by negligent acts of the employees of 
governmental entities, there is no waiver if the injury: 
(a) Arises out of the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function; or, 
(b) Arises out of a failure to make an inspection or 
by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of 
property. (Sections 63-30-10(1)(a), 63-30-10(1)(d)). 
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Salt Lake County's role in the control of flood and 
storm waters for the benefit of the citizens residing in the 
County is based upon the authority provided by Section 17-8-5. 
Utah Code Annotated. 1953 as amended. That statute states: 
"In anticipation of and to provide for the 
carrying away and the safe disposal of 
natural storm and flood waters, the board of 
county commissioners may remove any obstacle 
from any natural channel within the County 
and the incorporated municipalities in the 
County. For the same purpose, the board may 
plan for and construct new channels, storm 
sewers and drains to serve as though they 
were natural channels...The board of 
commissioners may also provide for the 
maintenance, improvement and fencing of all 
such channels, including covering or 
replacement with buried conduits...." 
By this statute, the legislature authorized counties 
to engage in flood and storm water control through use and 
regulation of natural channels, as well as new channels to 
serve as though they were natural channels. The amount and 
type of flood control effort is left to the discretion of the 
Board of County Commissioners. The statute imposes no mandate 
or duty for any type or level of flood control, but only an 
authority to act which the Board "may" exercise. In Board of 
Education of Granite School District v. Salt Lake County. 659 
P.2d 1030 (Utah, 1983). the Court stated. "This Court assumes 
that the terms of a statute are used advisedly and should be 
given an interpretation and application which is accord with 
their usually accepted meanings." (Id., at 1035). A provision 
of a statute couched in permissive terms is generally regarded 
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as discretionary unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise. (73 Am Jur 2d "Statutes'1 Section 22). In Grant v. 
Utah State Land Board. 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah. 1971), the Court 
applied the general rule stated above and found the word "may," 
in a statute pertaining to the land board, not to import 
certainity, but uncertainity; and thus, the reasonable 
deduction to be made was that the ordinary meaning of the term 
"may" was that one "may" or "may not" act. Similarly, the term 
"may" in Section 17-8-5 vests the Board of County Commissioners 
with discretion as to the amount or extent of flood and storm 
water management it will provide. 
This is in harmony with the general principles of law 
relating to the provision of flood control by local 
governments. According to McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 
(3rd Edition Revised, 1984) Section 53.119: 
"The establishment of sewers and drains by a 
municipal corporation is the exercise of a 
legislative or quasi-judicial power and the 
legislative body of the municipality is the 
sole judge of the necessity therefore. At 
common law, a municipal corporation is under 
no obligation to provide drainage or sewage 
to its inhabitants, unless rendered 
necessary by its own acts, and its omission 
to do so will not render it liable in 
damages." 
In the case at bar. Salt Lake City planned and 
constructed the conduit for City Creek. In fact, construction 
of it was completed in 1925. However, the above discussion is 
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relevant in that although the Plaintiffs allege improper design 
of the conduit, the facts conclusively show, without any 
contradiction, that the thing Plaintiffs can complain about 
concerning the conduit is that it wasn't large enough to carry 
the unprecedented flows of City Creek in 1983—flows which 
doubled the previously recorded highs. The sizing and 
placement of the conduit were discretionary functions of the 
city authorities involved. From that date to present, any 
decision of Salt Lake City and/or Salt Lake County to enlarge 
or not to enlarge the conduit continued to be the exercise of a 
discretionary function, taking into account the interpretation 
of data, appropriate design parameters, community resources, 
balancing of needs among various government services, etc. As 
futher sated in McQuillan, op.cit.. Section 53.121, "acts of 
municipal authorities in adopting plans for sewers and drains 
and in determining when and where sewers and drains are to be 
constructed are generally recognized as quasi-judicial, as they 
involve an exercise of judgment and discretion." 
For the reasons stated, the sizing and placement of 
the City Creek conduit involve the exercise of discretion by 
the governing authorities of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake 
County and the Defendants are immune from suit for any injuries 
alleged to arise from a conduit which was simply too small to 
handle the unprecedented flows of 1983. 
Plaintiffs further allege negligence in the inspection 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the conduit, which lack of inspection somehow (no causal 
connection is ever shown by Plaintiffs by affidavit, 
deposition, or otherwise) caused a blockage in the conduit. As 
set forth above. Section 63-30-10(1)(d) preserves sovereign 
immunity for injury arising out of inspection of the lack 
thereof. In White v. State, 579 P.2d 921, Utah 1978, the 
Plaintiff alleged the State of Utah, particularly the 
Occupational, Safety and Health Division, was obligated to 
inspect and become aware of a plant's violation of safety 
standards. However, the Court ruled that Section 
63-30-10(1)(d) immunized the State from liability. Upon the 
same basis. Salt Lake County is immune from suit for injuries 
alleged to arise from a failure to inspect the City Creek 
conduit for possible defects or dangers. 
Plaintiffs place a great deal of reliance on Section 
63-30-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. That statute 
waives immunity for injury caused by a dangerous or defective 
condition of a public structure, but preserves immunity for 
injuries arising from latent, defective conditions. However, 
Plaintiffs are unable to point to any defective or dangerous 
condition of the City Creek conduit. They make allegations 
about "design defects," but the affidavits and depositions do 
not establish any design defect whatsoever. A conduit which is 
designed to carry 130-160 cfs without being pressurized, or 250 
cfs while pressurized, does not contain any defect when it 
cannot handle flows of 350 cfs. Nor does a conduit necessarily 
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contain a defect because it becomes blocked by the settling out 
of sediments from flood waters which carry thousands of tons of 
sediments. If it were a defect, design or otherwise, for a 
blockage to occur under those conditions. Plaintiffs utterly 
fail to establish it through affidavit or deposition or any 
other fact properly submitted to the Court below. Thus, since 
the conduit functioned as it was designed to do, any defect 
must necessarily have been latent at best, since it was and is 
now a "defect which reasonably careful inspection will not 
reveal." (Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 
(Utah, 1978)). As such. Section 63-30-10(1)(d), immunizes Salt 
Lake County from suit for injuries alleged to have arisen from 
a dangerous condition or defect in the City Creek conduit. 
Plaintiffs1 complaint really goes only to a lack of 
capacity of the City Creek system as it passes from the open 
channel, ending at Memory Grove through the undergound conduit 
down Canyon Road and North Temple, to the outlet at the Jordan 
River. They complain that the system should have a bigger 
conduit, or another detention basin, etc. They can point to no 
defect or dangerous condition. They are similar to a citizen 
or group of citizens who complain they have been injured 
because the city or county only hired 35 deputies or policemen 
instead of 40;; or that their property value was "taken" because 
the city or county closed a golf course or library in their 
neighborhood. Thus, Plaintiffs raise only political questions. 
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not legal, and the judgment of the lower court should be 
sustained on those grounds (See McQuillans, Municipal 
Corporations (3rd Ed., 1979 Rev. Vol.), Section 10.33), as well 
as upon the grounds of sovereign immunity. 
II. Can Plaintiffs1 Alleged Injury be Considered a 
"Taking" Which Requires Compensation? 
Plaintiffs1 property was never touched by the flood 
waters of City Creek. North Temple itself was completely 
blocked only to accommodate the flood waters for a few days. 
Thereafter, the open conduit and barricades placed alongside 
that open conduit to warn the public, constituted a "median" 
which prevented the crossing of the street, but did not prevent 
the flow of traffic in both directions. Except for the short 
time that North Temple was completely blocked for flood waters, 
traffic could enter onto and exit from the Plaintiffs' 
properties by making right turns. Plaintiffs complain, 
however, that the short period of complete blockage of North 
Temple to permit passage of flood waters, the work upon the 
conduit to remove the blockage, and the later existence of the 
"median" which restricted traffic from turning left into, or 
out of their property, constitute an unlawful "taking" of 
their property rights. 
Plaintiffs cite no authority for their claim that the 
circumstances involved here constitute a "taking" of their 
property without just compensation. However, the authority 
against their contention is overwhelming. 
It is apparent that Plaintiffs have no authority to 
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seek redress for their alleged injury under the claim that they 
have suffered an unlawful "taking." This Court has not 
recognized a cause of action in Utah sounding in inverse 
condemnation. Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P. 2d 105 
(Utah, 1960) is explicit authority for the principle that one 
cannot sue the sovereign for the "taking" of property because 
the sovereign is immune. The Court stated: 
"...consistently and historically we have 
ruled that the State may not be sued without 
its consent, taken the view that Article I, 
Section 22 of our (Utah) Constitution is not 
self-executing, nor does it give consent to 
be sued, implied or otherwise, and that to 
secure such consent is a legislative matter, 
a principle recognized by the legislature 
itself (citing authority). Other state and 
federal courts have agreed (citing 
authority)." (Id. at 106) 
This case predated the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
which was adopted in 1965. It was then contended by the 
Plaintiffs in Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 511 P.2d 1286 
(Utah, 1973) that the Governmental Immunity Act, in Section 
63-30-6, was the legislature's consent to sue the sovereign in 
inverse condemnation. The Court stated: 
"It is our opinion that reading Section 6 
(63-30-6) in the light of that rule (strict 
application of act to preserve sovereign 
immunity), the waiver of immunity from suit 
'for the recovery of any property real or 
personal or for the possession thereof' 
cannot be construed to include an action of 
this character to recover damages for 
inconvenience of access to property 
(emphasis added), nor as changing the 
law " (Id., at 1288). 
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Again, in Walton v. State, Road Commision, 558 P.2d 609 (Utah 
1976) the Court stated: 
"as to any alleged 'taking1 without 
compensation and or types of claims that are 
or are not compensable, one of our own 
recent cases. Holt v. Utah Road Commission, 
is not only appropos here, but it and the 
cases it refers to are the basis for 
affirmance of the lower court's judgment (in 
favor of State and Road Commission). (Id., 
at 611). 
Thus, sovereign immunity bars the Plaintiffs' in the 
case here from suing Salt Lake County, and other Defendants for 
a "taking" of their ingress and egress "rights" with respect to 
North Temple. 
Even if an action for a "taking" of property were 
allowed by Utah law. Plaintiffs in this case cannot establish 
that any of Defendants have appropriated their property rights 
to public use. From jurisdictions that have considered the 
issue the rule is overwhelming that a "taking" is more than 
mere damage to property, more than a rare or infrequent 
interference. There must be a permanent deprivation of the 
property. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); 
Hartwiq v. United States, 485 F.2d 615 (Ct. CI. 1973); Fromme 
v. United States, 412 F.2d 1192 (Ct. CI. 1969) (which states, 
"one flooding...or two floodings...cannot be regarded as a 
taking of a permanent interest in the effected land"). 
"To constitute a taking, there must be an intent on 
the part of the condemnor to take the condemnee's property, or. 
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at least, an intention to do an act the natural consequences of 
which was to take the property." Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
Third Edition, (1983) Section 6.01(1). In the instant case, 
there is no factual justification established for the bald 
assertation of Plaintiffs1 that the Defendants have 
intentionally taken their rights of access to North Temple for 
public use as a permanent, natural channel for the passage of 
the waters of City Creek. 
The legal principles regarding the exercise of police 
power by governmental entities also preclude Plaintiffs from 
maintaining a cause of action against the Defendants in this 
case. As stated in Nichols, o.p. cit.. Section 6.37(4), 
"interference with passage along a public highway under an 
exercise of the police power is, of course, not compensible. 
Thus the damage to an abutter is damnum absque injuria where 
traffic is diverted by...the installation of a median strip, 
elimination of the mode and type of traffic, the institution of 
one-way traffic, the installation of curbs or guard rails and 
the regulation of access by the control of drive-way 
permits...." In Sprinqville Banking Company v. Burton, 349 
P.2d 157 (Utah, 1960) the court applied this rule to deny 
Plaintiff's demand for damages in a case where the installation 
of a median strip made access to Plaintiffs' property less 
convenient. See also, Anderson Investment Corp. v. State, 503 
P.2d 144, 145 (Utah, 1972). 
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Beyond question, it was a proper exercise of the 
police power for the governmental authorities involved here to 
act quickly to control City Creek waters within the North 
Temple right-of-way duriing the 1983 flood. They had a right 
to engage in the repair of the blocked and damaged conduit, and 
they had a duty to protect the traveling public from any danger 
existing as a result of an open channel within the North Temple 
right-of-way. Further, it would be inconceivable that a 
governing body could validly exercise its police power to 
control traffic by installing a permanent median, and yet be 
held liable for a "taking" of access rights of abutters when it 
temporarily places a "median" consisting of an open channel 
with barricades erected to prevent traffic from falling into 
that channel. 
In further considering the use of the police power 
held by Defendants in this case, the following language from 
McQuillan op. cit. Section 53.58, is instructive: 
"The police power extends to the destruction 
of property, including the pulling down of 
buildings to arrest the progress of a 
fire.... Such destruction is not the taking 
of property for public use by an exercise of 
the right of eminent domain, but instead a 
destruction of it to avert an imminent 
public injury, which is a different thing 
from taking by the right of eminent domain, 
and is in no legal sense an exercise of that 
right but stands on entirely different 
ground, namely on the gound of necessity, 
or, more properly speaking, on the ground of 
the police power..., whereas the right of 
eminent domain stands on constitutional 
grounds. The right of eminent domain can 
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wait the forms and delay of the law, but (a 
local governments•s) right to destroy 
property is governed by necessity which 
knows no law. 
...[T]here is no municipal liability for the 
destruction of property by the corporation 
where the public necessity requires it, 
since the rights of private property are 
subordinate to the public welfare—salus 
populi suprema est lex.... This rule 
obtained under the old common law, and is 
well known...and, ordinarily there is no 
municipal liability where property is 
destroyed or damaged for the purpose of 
controlling flood waters." 
The author of that particular treatise cites the Utah 
case of McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097 (Utah, 1957) 
as one of several authorities for the foregoing language. 
In McKell, the court considered the case of a 
landowner seeking damages from Spanish Fork City which resulted 
from the placement by city authorities of dikes to contol the 
exceedingly heavy snowmelt runoff of 1952 in the Spanish Fork 
River. As the flood waters threatened to inundate a large area 
and damage several properties, the dike was placed which 
channeled the water through Plaintiff's property and caused 
damage which would not otherwise have occurred. The Court 
ruled that in the case of extraordinary floods, i.e., one which 
is not foreshadowed by the usual course of nature and is of 
such magnitude and destructiveness as could not have been 
anticipated or provided against by the exercise of ordinary 
foresight, it was permissible to erect defensive barriers, in 
an effort to control the flood waters, without liability to 
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adjoining landowners. The Court stated that in an organized 
society, collective efforts to cope with adversities may result 
in the serious damage or sacrifice to the property of some. 
But such efforts must be allowed, "were it not so, defenses 
against such things would be impossible.M (Id. at 1100). The 
Court in McKell also noted that the flood involved consisted of 
flows in Spanish Fork River which doubled the flows of the 
worst flood previously known, this was sufficient to support a 
finding that such a flood was "extraordinary." In the present 
case, the flows of City Creek also more than doubled the 
previously known high flows therein and were of a magnitude and 
destructiveness which could not have been prevented. McKell is 
in harmony with the following principle as stated in 16A 
Am.Jur.2d "Constitutional Law." Sections 369-370: 
"...;[T]his maxim ('salus propuli 
supreme lex est.1 or. 'the welfare of the 
people is the highest law' ) is the 
foundation principle of all civil 
government.... All private rights enjoyed 
by individuals as members of the public are 
subject to the paramount right of the state 
to modify them to conserve the public 
welfare under this maxim. 
"The police power is the power of 
self-protection on the part of the 
community, and bears the same relation to 
the community that the principle of 
self-defense bears to the individual." 
Based upon the principles of law relative to the 
police power, it is apparent in this case that Plaintiffs are 
not entitled to a recovery based upon the uncontroverted facts 
established through the affidavits, depositions, answers to 
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interrogatories and request for admissions on file in the Court 
below that Defendants properly used their police powers to 
combat an extraordinary flood, and to protect the public during 
the flood and the subsequent repair of the conduit damaged by 
that flood. 
In any event, Utah law does not recognize a right to 
compensation from the sovereign for loss of access to property, 
particularly where the loss is only partial and access is still 
possible. Walton v. State Road Commission, supra; Holt v. Utah 
State Road Commission, supra. See also Sprinqville Banking 
Company v. Burton, supra. 
Finally, Plaintiffs attempt to create a "red herring" 
in this appeal by alleging that their complaint states a cause 
of action and referring to "facts" which are in dispute. This 
case is not here on an appeal from a dismissal of their 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Summary 
Judgment was rendered below based upon facts entered pursuant 
to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs are 
attempting to base their appeal upon "facts" which were not 
even presented by them in the case below pursuant to said 
Rule. In fact, the entire first paragraph of Plaintiffs1 
"Statement of Facts," set forth on pages 3-4 of their brief, 
have no support in the record as having been presented to the 
trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c). These so-called "facts" 
are alleged by Plaintiffs to be based upon materials which were 
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merely attached to Plaintiffs1 memorandum to the trial court in 
opposition to Defendants1 motions for final disposition of the 
case. As such, they were not based- upon the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or 
affidavits, and are not facts which this Court should consider 
on appeal. 
Even if such "facts" had been appropriate for 
consideration, they are totally irrelevant to the Court's 
ruling below for Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants. Said 
ruling was based upon sovereign immunity which, as argued 
above, applies to Defendants in this case despite the existance 
or non-existance of Plaintiffs1 alleged facts. Nevertheless, 
Salt Lake County takes exception to Plaintiffs' 
mischaracterization of the testimony of Terry Holzworth in his 
deposition as to the maximum flows of City Creek (see 
Plaintiff's brief, pages 16-17). On page 8 of his deposition 
(R.581), Mr. Holzworth testified that the County's direct guage 
readings showed a peak flow in City Creek sometime between May 
30 and June 2, 1983, slightly in excess of 300 cfs, and 
explained that the guage readings were dependent on a 
continually eroding cross channel of the creek. He further 
explained that the actual flow could have been higher or lower 
than the guage readings, so he gave a range of the flow being 
between 275 to 320 cfs. This is far different from the 
assertion by Plaintiffs' in their brief that Mr. Holzworth 
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placed a maximum flow at 250 cfs. It should also be noted that 
Mr. Holzworth stated on page 9 of his deposition that the flow 
in City Creek exceeded the design capacity of the drainage 
system for a period of 18-20 days. 
Salt Lake County also takes exception to the 
characterization of Charles H. Call's deposition testimony 
(R.586) by Plaintiffs1 on page 16 of their brief to the effect 
that the City Creek conduit should have carried 250 cfs. The 
question posed to Mr. Call assumed a pressurized conduit which 
can carry a greater flow than can a non-pressurized conduit. 
The facts in this case are clear that the system was not 
pressurized and could not be pressurized because of the extreme 
flows of water. See depositions of Max Peterson (R.582 pages 
12-13) and deposition of Al Haines (R.584 page 11). Further. 
the question to Mr. Call did not ask him to determine flows of 
water through the conduit which carried such high sediment 
loads as were experienced in this case. 
These are but two examples of Plaintiffs' 
mischaracterization and misconstruction of the evidence 
presented to the Court below. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion. Salt Lake County has been immunized 
from suit in this case by the law established through this 
Court under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. There was 
never a waiver of the immunity established back as far as 1913 
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in the case of Wilkinson v. State. The 1965 adoption of the 
Governmental Immunity Act did not change the law in that regard 
and this was made explicitly clear by the 1984 amendment to 
Section 63-30-3. Further, the law of Utah does not recognize 
Plaintiffs1 claim of a "taking" of ingress-egress rights to 
North Temple, which under other clear and overwhelming 
authority was not a "taking" in any event. Therefore, the 
ruling of the Court below entering Summary Judgment in favor of 
Salt Lake County and other Defendants should be sustained. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S>1^ day of September, 
1985. 
7£*~+- ^,e&~J*£ 
KEVAN F. SMITH 
DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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